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In the Gaussian-modulated coherent states (GMCS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol,
Alice prepares quantum states actively : for each transmission, Alice generates a pair of Gaussian-
distributed random numbers, encodes them on a weak coherent pulse using optical amplitude and
phase modulators, and then transmits the Gaussian-modulated weak coherent pulse to Bob. Here we
propose a passive state preparation scheme using a thermal source. In our scheme, Alice splits the
output of a thermal source into two spatial modes using a beam splitter. She measures one mode
locally using conjugate optical homodyne detectors, and transmits the other mode to Bob after
applying appropriate optical attenuation. Under normal conditions, Alice’s measurement results
are correlated to Bob’s, and they can work out a secure key, as in the active state preparation
scheme. Given the initial thermal state generated by the source is strong enough, this scheme can
tolerate high detector noise at Alice’s side. Furthermore, the output of the source does not need to be
single mode, since an optical homodyne detector can selectively measure a single mode determined
by the local oscillator. Preliminary experimental results suggest that the proposed scheme could be
implemented using an off-the-shelf amplified spontaneous emission source. a
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has drawn a lot of
attention for its proven security against adversaries with
unlimited computing power [1–6]. In QKD, two remote
legitimate users (Alice and Bob) can establish a secure
key by transmitting quantum states through an insecure
channel controlled by the adversary (Eve). Any attacks
by Eve will, with a high probability, disturb the trans-
mitted quantum state, and thus can be detected.
Many practical QKD systems are based on the so-
called prepare-and-measure scheme, where Alice prepares
quantum states and transmits them to Bob, who in turn
performs measurements. The quantum state preparation
step is conventionally implemented in an active manner:
Alice first generates truly random numbers using a quan-
tum random number generator [7, 8], which she uses to
prepare a corresponding quantum state by performing
modulations on the output of a single source, or switch-
ing among multiple sources. One well-known example is
the decoy state BB84 QKD using phase randomized weak
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coherent sources [9–11], where for each transmission, Al-
ice needs to randomly prepare one of the four BB84 states
[1], randomly change the average photon number (to gen-
erate either the signal state or one of the decoy states)
and (in certain implementations) the global phase of the
weak coherent state [12]. As the transmission rate in
QKD has been growing dramatically over the years, it is
becoming more and more challenging to prepare quan-
tum state precisely at the corresponding speed.
More recently, passive state preparation schemes have
been proposed in QKD as an alternative approach [13–
25]. In this scheme, Alice explores intrinsic fluctuations
of the source, or intentionally designs the source in a way
such that certain parameters (for example, intensity) will
present unpredictable fluctuations. Typically, two opti-
cal modes with correlated fluctuations are output from
the source. By measuring one mode locally, Alice can
determine the random noise carried by the other mode,
which will be transmitted to Bob. This idea was initially
proposed as a simple way to generate random intensity
fluctuations in the decoy-state QKD protocols [13–15].
Later on, it was also applied in preparing the four BB84
states approximately [24].
So far the passive state preparation scheme has only
been studied in discrete-variable (DV) QKD based on
single photon detection. Here we propose a passive state
preparation scheme in continuous-variable (CV) QKD
based on coherent detection [26–28].
CV-QKD based on coherent detection could poten-
tially be a cost-effective solution in practice, especially
over a relatively short distance [29]. One of the most
promising CV-QKD protocols is the Gaussian-modulated
coherent states (GMCS) QKD [28], which has been
2demonstrated over practical distances [28, 30–35]. Simi-
lar to the case of DV QKD, in the GMCS QKD, quantum
states are prepared actively: for each transmission, Al-
ice first generates a pair of Gaussian-distributed random
numbers, then encodes them on a weak coherent state
using optical amplitude and phase modulators. Since
the modulation format is relatively complicated and the
tolerable modulation error is small, high extinction ratio
modulators with good stability are required in the GMCS
QKD [36].
In this paper, we propose a passive state preparation
scheme using a thermal source. One observation is that
in the GMCS QKD, from Eve and Bob’s point of views,
the quantum states sent by Alice are thermal. So, in-
stead of preparing a thermal state from a coherent state
by preforming Gaussian modulations, Alice can simply
use a thermal source: Alice splits the output of the ther-
mal source into two spatial modes using a beam split-
ter. She measures both the X and P quadratures of one
mode using conjugate optical homodyne detectors, and
transmits the other mode to Bob after applying appro-
priate optical attenuation. To estimate the quadrature
values of the outgoing mode, Alice can scale down her
measurement results by the attenuation applied on the
outgoing beam. At Bob’s end, he performs similar mea-
surements to determine the quadrature values of the re-
ceived state. Under normal conditions, Alice’s measure-
ment results will be correlated to Bob’s, and they can
further work out a secure key. Note in this scheme, the
shared randomness originates from the intrinsic quadra-
ture fluctuations of a thermal state. We remark that our
propsoal is differet from previous studies on CV-QKD us-
ing noisy coherent state or thermal state [37–39], where
the super-Poissonian photon statistics of the source is re-
garded as excess noise in CV-QKD based on active state
preparation. It was first proposed in [37] that the above
preparation noise could be suppressed by increasing the
modulation variance and then applying strong attenua-
tion.
One may wonder whether the vacuum noise introduced
by Alice’s conjugate optical homodyne detection will ulti-
mately prevent her from acquiring a precise estimation of
the quadrature values of the outgoing mode. As we will
show in this paper, given the initial thermal state gen-
erated by the source is strong enough, the contribution
of Alice’s detector noise on the estimation error of the
outgoing state can be reduced effectively by introducing
high attenuation on the outgoing mode.
In practice, it may be difficult to prepare a single mode
thermal state and match its spectral-temporal mode with
that of the local oscillator (LO) used in homodyne de-
tection. Fortunately, to implement our protocol, Alice’s
thermal source does not need to be single mode. The
LO in homodyne detection acts as a mode “filter” and
can selectively measure only one mode emitted by the
source. By using a multimode (broadband) source, it is
also easy to align the central wavelength of the LO within
the spectrum of the thermal source.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
present details of the GMCS QKD based on a passive
state preparation scheme. In Section III, we conduct nu-
merical simulations to estimate the potential secure key
rates of the proposed scheme. In Section IV, we char-
acterize the output of a practical amplified spontaneous
emission (ASE) source. Preliminary results suggest that
such a source could be employed to implement the pas-
sive state preparation scheme. Finally, we conclude this
paper with a discussion in Section V.
II. PASSIVE STATE PREPARATION SCHEME
Presently, the GMCS QKD protocol is implemented
based on the prepare-and-measure scheme: for each
transmission, Alice draws two random numbers xA and
pA, prepares a coherent state |xA + ipA〉 accordingly,
and sends the prepared state to Bob through an insecure
quantum channel. Here xA and pA are Gaussian random
numbers with zero mean and a variance of VAN0, where
VA is the modulation variance chosen by Alice, and N0
= 1/4 denotes the shot-noise variance. At Bob’s end,
he can either implement the homodyne protocol [28] by
randomly measuring X or P quadrature for each incom-
ing pulse, or he can implement the heterodyne protocol
[40] by first splitting the incoming pulse into two, and
then measuring one in X basis and the other in P basis.
After the above quantum transmission stage, Alice and
Bob estimate the transmission efficiency and added noise
of the channel. If the observed noise is below a certain
threshold, they can work out a secure key by performing
reconciliation and privacy amplification.
Note, from Eve and Bob’s point of views, the state
from Alice is a single mode thermal state with an aver-
age photon number of VA/2. In fact, the security of the
GMCS QKD is commonly proved based on an equivalent
entanglement-based protocol [41], where Alice performs
conjugate homodyne detection on one mode of a two-
mode squeezed vacuum state and sends the other mode
to Bob. In this picture, the state from Alice is indeed
thermal.
Here, we propose a passive state preparation scheme
using a thermal source. While this protocol can be conve-
niently implemented with a multi-mode thermal source,
for simplicity, in this section we assume the thermal
source is single mode. The protocol is summarized as
follows (see Fig.1).
1. Alice splits the output of a thermal source into two
spatial modes (mod1 and mod2 in Fig.1) using a
50:50 beam splitter. We assume the average output
photon number of the source is n0.
2. Alice attenuates the average photon number of
mod1 down to VA/2 by using an optical attenua-
tor and transmits it to Bob. Here VA < n0 is the
desired modulation variance.
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FIG. 1: The proposed passive state preparation scheme
in the GMCS QKD. BS1/BS2-50:50 beam splitter;
Att.-optical attenuator; HD-homodyne detector. The
efficiency of homodyne detector is modeled by a beam
splitter with a transmittance of ηD. Note the
combination of BS1 and Att. could be replaced by an
asymmetric beam splitter.
3. Alice measures both the X and P quadratures of
mod2 by performing conjugate homodyne detec-
tion. From her measurement results of {x2, p2},
Alice estimates the quadrature values of the out-
going mode as xA =
√
2ηA
ηD
x2 and pA =
√
2ηA
ηD
p2,
where ηA is the transmittance of the optical atten-
uator and ηD is the efficiency of Alice’s detector.
4. Bob measures both the X and P quadratures of
the received quantum state by performing conju-
gate homodyne detection. His measurement results
are {xB, pB}.
5. Alice and Bob repeat the above process many
times.
6. Alice and Bob perform reconciliation and pri-
vacy amplification on the raw data {xA, pA} and
{xB, pB}. Given the observed noise is below a cer-
tain threshold, they can work out a secure key. This
step is the same as in the active state preparation
scheme.
Note from Eve’s point of view, the quantum state sent
by Alice in this passive state preparation scheme is the
same as the one in the conventional active state prepa-
ration scheme. So the well-established security proofs of
the GMCS QKD can be applied directly in our scheme.
To evaluate the secure key rate, we need to determine
how much additional noise will be introduced by this
passive state preparation scheme. As we will show be-
low, given the thermal state generated by the source is
bright enough, our scheme can tolerate high noise and
low efficiency of Alice’s detector. We remark that the
combination of BS1 and Att. in Fig.1 could be replaced
by an asymmetric beam splitter.
For simplicity, we only consider the X-quadrature be-
low. The P-quadrature can be studied in a similar way.
The X-quadrature of the outgoing state is given by
x1 =
√
ηA
2
xin +
√
1− ηA
2
xv1, (1)
where xin stands for the X-quadrature of the output of
the source, ηA is the transmittance of the optical attenu-
ator, and xv1 represents vacuum noise introduced by the
beam splitter and the attenuator.
Similarly, Alice’s measurement result of X-quadrature
is given by
x2 =
√
ηD
4
xin +
√
1− ηD
4
xv2 +Nel, (2)
where ηD and Nel are the efficiency and noise of Alice’s
detector; xv2 represents vacuum noise due to the two
50:50 beam splitters and the loss of detector. We assume
Nel is Gaussian noise with zero mean and a variance of
υel. In this paper, all of the noise variances are defined
in the shot-noise unit.
Alice can estimate x1 from her measurement result x2
using
xA =
√
2ηA
ηD
x2. (3)
Using (1) to (3), Alice’s uncertainty on x1 is given by
∆ = 〈(xA − x1)2〉 = 2ηA
ηD
(1 + υel − ηD
2
) + 1. (4)
From (4), the excess noise (the noise above vacuum
noise) due to the passive state preparation scheme is
given by
εA = ∆− 1 = 2ηA
ηD
(1 + υel − ηD
2
). (5)
From (5), by increasing the attenuation on the out-
going mode (decreasing ηA), the excess noise εA can be
effectively reduced. The maximum attenuation Alice can
apply is constrained by the average photon number n0 of
the thermal state produced by the source and the desired
modulation variance VA. Using the relation VA = ηAn0,
we can revise (5) as
εA =
2VA
n0ηD
(1 + υel − ηD
2
). (6)
From (6), given a desired modulation variance VA, the
brighter the source, the smaller the excess noise intro-
duced by Alice. A typical homodyne detector in the
GMCS QKD can achieve ηD = 0.5 and υel = 0.1. For
a typical value of VA = 1, to reduce the excess noise εA
below 0.01, the required average photon number of the
source is about 340 (per spatial-temporal mode), which
can be satisfied by a practical ASE source, as shown in
Section IV.
4III. SIMULATION RESULTS
We conduct numerical simulations of the secure key
rates of the passive state preparation scheme. The
asymptotic secure key rate of the GMCS QKD, in the
case of reverse reconciliation, is given by Refs. [30, 42]
R = fIAB − χBE , (7)
where IAB is the Shannon mutual information between
Alice and Bob; f is the efficiency of the reconciliation
algorithm; χBE is the Holevo bound between Eve and
Bob. IAB and χBE can be determined from the channel
loss, observed noises, and other QKD system parameters.
We assume the quantum channel between Alice and
Bob is telecom fiber with an attenuation coefficient of γ.
The channel transmittance is given by
T = 10
−γL
10 , (8)
where L is the fiber length in kilometers.
In the case of conjugate homodyne detection, the noise
added by Bob’s detector (referred to Bob’s input) is given
by [42]
χhet = [1 + (1− ηD) + 2υel]/ηD, (9)
where we have assumed that Bob’s detector has the same
performance as Alice’s.
The channel-added noise referred to the channel input
is given by
χline =
1
T
− 1 + εE, (10)
where εE is the excess noise due to Eve’s attack. In
practice any untrusted noise from the QKD system can
be included into εE . Here, we separate εE into two terms
εE = εA + ε0, (11)
where εA is the excess noise due to the passive state
preparation scheme as given in (6). ε0 represents other
sources of untrusted noise.
The overall noise referred to the channel input is given
by
χtot = χline +
χhet
T
. (12)
Since both quadratures can be used to generate secure
key, the mutual information between Alice and Bob can
be determined by
IAB = log2
V + χtot
1 + χtot
, (13)
where V = VA + 1.
To estimate χBE , we adopt the realistic noise model
where Eve cannot control the loss inside Bob’s system,
and the detector noise from Bob is assumed to be trusted
[28]. This noise model has been widely used in CV-QKD
experiments [28, 30–33]. Under this model, the Holevo
bound of the information between Eve and Bob is given
by Ref. [30]
χBE =
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
−
5∑
i=3
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
, (14)
where G(x) = (x+ 1)log2(x + 1)− xlog2x.
λ21,2 =
1
2
[
A±
√
A2 − 4B
]
, (15)
where
A = V 2(1− 2T ) + 2T + T 2(V + χline)2, (16)
B = T 2(V χline + 1)
2. (17)
λ23,4 =
1
2
[
C ±
√
C2 − 4D
]
, (18)
where
C =
1
(T (V + χtot))2
[Aχ2het +B + 1 + 2χhet
(V
√
B + T (V + χline)) + 2T (V
2 − 1)],
(19)
D =
(
V +
√
Bχhet
T (V + χtot)
)2
. (20)
λ5 = 1. (21)
Simulation parameters are summarized as follows: γ =
0.2 dB/km, ε0 = 0.01, υel = 0.1, ηD = 0.5, and f = 0.95.
The modulation variance VA is numerically optimized at
different fiber lengths.
In Fig. 2 we present the relations of the secure key
rate and the fiber length for three different average pho-
ton number n0. As shown in Fig.2, a thermal source
with an average output photon number above 100 can
be employed to implement the passive CV QKD scheme
efficiently.
IV. ASE SOURCE CHARACTERIZATION
Previous studies have shown that the ASE noise gen-
erated by a fiber amplifier is thermal [43, 44]. In [45],
we conducted conjugate homodyne detection and veri-
fied the photon statistics of a single mode component
(selected by the LO) of an ASE source follows a Bose-
Einstein distribution, as expected from a single mode
thermal state. Nevertheless, the average photon num-
ber of the thermal state in the previous experiment [45]
is relatively low (about 15). Here, we use a similar setup
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FIG. 2: Simulation results of the secure key rate for 3
different average photon number of the thermal state:
n0=50, 100, 500. Other simulation parameters: γ = 0.2
dB/km; ε0 = 0.01; υel = 0.1; ηD = 0.5; f = 0.95
to characterize the output of a commercial ASE source
operated at higher output power.
The experimental setup is shown in Fig.3. A fiber am-
plifier (PriTel, Inc.) with vacuum state input is employed
as a broadband thermal source. A 0.8nm optical band-
pass filter centered at 1542nm is placed after the ASE
source (BP in Fig.3) to reduce the power of unused light.
To select out a single polarization mode, a fiber pig-
tailed polarizer is employed (Pol in Fig.3). A continuous-
wave (CW) laser source with a central wavelength of
1542nm (Clarity-NLL-1542-HP from Wavelength Refer-
ence) is employed as the LO in coherent detection. Note
it is not necessary to stabilize the laser wavelength, which
can never drift out the above 0.8nm range under normal
operation. A variable optical attenuator (VOA in Fig.3)
is used to adjust the LO power, and a fiber polarization
controller (PC in Fig.3) is used to match the polarization
of the LO with that of the thermal source. To perform
conjugate optical homodyne detection, we use a com-
mercial 90o optical hybrid (Optoplex) and two balanced
amplified photodetectors (Thorlabs). The outputs of the
two balanced photodetectors are sampled by a real time
oscilloscope.
The noise of the two balanced detectors have been de-
termined to be 0.37 and 0.35 in the shot noise unit. The
overall detection efficiency (taking into account the loss
of the 90o optical hybrid and the quantum efficiency of
the photo-diode) is about 0.5. Fig.4 shows the distribu-
tions of the measurement results with either a vacuum
input or a thermal input. By normalizing the quadra-
ture variances of the thermal state to the vacuum noise,
the average photon number (per mode) of the thermal
PC
90q 
Optical
Hybrid
OSC
BD
ASE
BP
LO
VOA
Pol
X
P
FIG. 3: Experimental setup. ASE-broadband thermal
source; LO-narrow-band laser source; BP-optical band
pass filter; Pol-fiber polarizer; VOA-variable optical
attenuator; PC-polarization controller; BD-balanced
photo-detector; OSC-oscilloscope.
FIG. 4: Experimental results shown in phase space.
The measurement results with both a vacuum input
and a thermal state input are presented.
state has been determined to be about 800. As discussed
in Section II, such a thermal source is bright enough to
implement the passive CV-QKD scheme. Fig.5 shows the
2-dimensional histogram of the measured data when the
input is a thermal state. The small deviation from a per-
fect 2-dimensional Gaussian distribution is most likely
due to the non-uniform bin size of the 8-bit analog-to-
digital converter of the oscilloscope.
The single-time second-order correlation function
g(2)(0) is an important parameter to characterize a pho-
ton source [46]. In [45], we have shown that g(2)(0) can
be conveniently calculated from the statistics of the con-
jugate homodyne measurement using
g(2)(0) =
〈Z2〉 − 4〈Z〉+ 2
(〈Z〉 − 1)2 , (22)
6FIG. 5: The histogram of the experimental results with
a thermal state input.
where Z = X2 + P 2.
From the experimental data, the g(2)(0) of the ASE
source has been determined to be 2.012, which is rea-
sonably close to the theoretical value of 2 for a perfect
thermal source.
V. DISCUSSION
Quantum state preparation is a crucial step in QKD.
In the GMCS QKD, this step is implemented using a ran-
dom number generator, a weak coherent source, and high
performance optical modulators. In this paper, we pro-
pose a passive state preparation scheme where Alice and
Bob generate shared randomness by measuring correlated
thermal states split from a common thermal source. This
scheme may significantly simplify the implementation of
CV-QKD and make it more practical. Note this scheme is
different from the entanglement-based QKD where each
of Alice and Bob measures a sub-system of an entangled
state. In the former, the trustworthiness of the source
is required, while in the latter, the entanglement source
may be controlled by Eve without compromising the se-
curity.
A few more words about imperfections at Alice’s side.
There are two types of imperfections to be addressed.
One is associated with the thermal source itself, and the
other is associated with Alice’s detector.
To deal with the imperfection of the thermal source it-
self, precise quantum state tomography can be performed
to quantify the deviation of the output of the source
from a perfect thermal state. This is especially important
when a multi-mode thermal source is employed. We need
to make sure there is no correlation between quadrature
values of different modes. Otherwise, Eve may gain in-
formation without introducing noise by measuring modes
not detected by Alice and Bob. Once the imperfection of
the source has been quantified, it should be taken into ac-
count in the secure proof and key rate calculation. The
output of a practical light source may drift with time,
which implies that the above state tomography process
may need to be repeated time by time. Of course, in the
conventional active state preparation scheme, both the
laser source and the modulators need to be calibrated
over time for similar reasons. It seems reasonable to be-
lieve that a thermal source operated in CW mode will
show better stability than optical modulators operated
at high speed. How to deal with the source imperfections
in CV-QKD has drawn much attention [36, 38, 47–50].
We leave this as a future research topic.
To deal with the imperfections of Alice’s detector, in
this paper we have made a conservative assumption that
Alice’s detector noise is untrusted and thus the corre-
sponding excess noise is attributed to Eve’s attack. In
practice Eve cannot access Alice’s system, so one could
assume that the above noise is trusted, just like the noise
from Bob’s detector. Under reverse reconciliation, the
trusted noise from Alice’s detector will reduce the mu-
tual information IAB but will not change Eve’s informa-
tion χBE . This trusted noise model can tolerate higher
detector noise and work with a lower photon number of
the source. We remark that to justify the trusted noise
model in practice, specially designed monitoring system
may be required to prevent Eve from manipulating the
detector performance.
Note in our scheme, the randomness is generated from
a thermal source. Can we trust this randomness? As has
been discussed in [51], while quantum randomness is ulti-
mately connected to quantum superposition states, in the
trusted device scenario, the state received by the detector
does not need to be a pure state. For example, trusted
randomness can be generated by measuring only one pho-
ton from an entangled photon pair, given Eve cannot ac-
cess the other photon. In our scheme, photons from the
thermal source are generated through spontaneous emis-
sion processes and are entangled with the atoms inside
the source. Given the source itself is protected from Eve,
true randomness can be generated.
While our theoretical discussions are based on a sin-
gle mode thermal state, in practice, the proposed scheme
can be implemented using a broadband source operated
in CW mode (a multi-mode source), thanks to the mode-
selective feature of coherent detection. Since the random-
ness carried by different modes of the source are indepen-
dent of each other, to generate shared randomness it is
crucial that Alice and Bob’s detectors measure the same
mode of the source. Furthermore, Alice and Bob need a
scheme to establish a phase reference between their ho-
modyne detection. Two schemes have been developed in
CV QKD based on active state preparation, and both
of them can be adopted in the passive state preparation
protocol. In this first scheme, Alice generates two strong
LOs from the same laser, uses one of them in her local
measurement, and sends the second one to Bob to be
used as a LO in his measurement. In the second scheme
7[52, 53], both Alice and Bob generate LOs from their own
local lasers. The phase relation between their measure-
ment bases can be determined by sending relatively weak
phase reference pulses from Alice to Bob.
This work was performed at Oak Ridge National
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U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under Contract No.
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manuscript, we noticed a related work by E. Newton,
et al. [54].
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